

DDI #01193-86
13 March 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, EURA
NIO/Europe

SUBJECT: Spain

1. Further to my telephone conversation with John McLaughlin, I think it would be a good idea to go back and assess why we were wrong on the outcome of the Spanish NATO referendum. From the NIE to typescripts and current intelligence, we consistently conveyed a pessimistic view that Gonzalez could bring off a victory. In one recent typescript, for example, the most optimistic scenario discussed was the outside possibility of a very narrow win -- "the best he could hope for."

25X1

2. I am even more disturbed by John's indication to me that, in fact, a number of the analysts felt "in their gut" that Gonzalez would be victorious. If so, that view certainly was not conveyed to me much less anyone in the policy community in any of our written materials. In the Political Instability Quarterly, we take note of the fact that sometimes analysts' instincts go contrary to the evidence and we even have a special column in the checklist where an instinctive assessment can be expressed -- and explicitly acknowledged as an analyst's "gut feel." I would like to know why, if the analysts felt this way, it somehow did not emerge in some respect in any of our assessments.

25X1

3. Because this story has a happy ending, I doubt that we will receive much outside criticism. For our own benefit, however, I believe we should closely examine this case and reflect on lessons that could be applied in the future.

25X1

RG

Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

cc: C/MPS/PES

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

SUBJECT: Spain

Distribution:

Original - D/EURA
1 - NIO/Europe
1 - DDI
1 - DI Action File
1 - DDI Registry

O/DDI/RGATES: /13MAR86

25X1

SECRET

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied